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WISCONSIN TAKEOVER LEGISLATION - GOOD
INTENTIONS CONSTITUTIONALLY
QUESTIONABLE
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 1987, Australian entrepreneur Alan Bond' and Amber
Acquisition Corporation2 made an unsolicited holiday weekend bid of $38 a
share, or $1.2 billion, to purchase G. Heileman Brewing Company of La-
Crosse, Wisconsin.3 In response to the tender offer, 4 the governor of Wis-
consin, supported by a coalition of local interests including mainline
business and labor groups, offered Heileman special legislative assistance to
stymie the takeover.5 On September 17, with little legislative resistance, the
governor signed two bills into law.6
Six days after the passage of Wisconsin's anti-takeover laws, Bond and
Heileman announced that they had signed a definitive merger agreement
providing for the Bond Corporation to increase its offer from $38 to $40.75
a share, or $1.22 billion, for all outstanding shares of Heileman.7 Heile-
man's board of directors unanimously approved the offer as amended and
1. See Reuters Bus. Report, Sept. 17, 1987. Alan Bond has substantial interests in mining,
brewing and real estate in Australia and is considered to be one of that country's richest individu-
als. Bond obtained world recognition in 1983 for his interest in yachting when he brought Austra-
lia the America's Cup. Id.
2. L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 2. Amber Acquisition Corporation is a subsidi-
ary of Bond Corporation. Bond Corporation is an Australian holding company engaged in a wide
variety of businesses, including brewing, television and radio broadcasting, property development
management, and energy resource exploration and development. Bond Corporation first estab-
lished a presence in the United States through its acquisition of Pittsburgh Brewing Corporation
in April 1986. Id.
3. Dun & Bradstreet Report, Dec. 31, 1986. Heileman Brewery was founded in 1853 by
Gund and Gottlieb Heileman. Heileman is principally engaged in the manufacturing and sale of
malt beverages (85%) through approximately 2100 independent wholesalers in all 50 states and
Canada. Before its merger with Bond, it ranked fourth among United States brewers and sixth
among world brewers. Id.
4. See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text; see also Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251-52
(1973).
5. Thompson Offers Help for Heileman, Milwaukee Sentinel, Sept. 9, 1987, § 3, at 4, col. 2.
Records A.B. 1 & A.B. 2, Sept. 1987 Spec. Sess., Assembly Committee on Trade, Industry and
Small Business (Sept. 15, 1987).
6. Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987 Wis. Act 44, 1987 Wis. Laws 581; Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987
Wis. Act 45, 1987 Wis. Laws 582. For a discussion of Wisconsin's new takeover legislation, see
generally Sklansky & Whitesel, Wisconsin's New Corporate Takeover Laws, 61 WIs. BAR BULL.
12-14, 34 (Feb. 1988).
7. Bond Corp. Holdings, Ltd., Raises its $38-a-Share Unsolicited Purchase Offer for G. Heile-
man to $40.75 a Share, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, § 4, at 6, col. 4.
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determined that the terms of the amended offer and merger were fair to
Heileman's shareholders. The Board then recommended that they accept
the offer and tender their shares.'
Wisconsin's legislative response to the Heileman tender offer is not an
isolated occurrence. Several states have enacted laws designed to prohibit
takeovers within their jurisdictions.9 These laws are often passed with unu-
sual speed and little opposition.
This Comment first provides a general overview of the takeover process
and tender offers.10 It also discusses the existing federal law which is tai-
lored to prevent the adverse effects of hostile takeovers. 1  It then considers
the states' historic role in the takeover process as well as the constitutional-
ity of state requirements aimed at protecting local interests.12 Particular
attention is given to the constitutionality of Wisconsin's new takeover legis-
lation.13 This Comment concludes by noting that Wisconsin's new takeover
statute, in its present form, is not likely to pass constitutional muster14 and
that the focus of future efforts to regulate the takeover process is likely to
shift to the federal arena and ultimately to the courts. 5
II. HISTORY OF THE TAKEOVER PROCESS
Vast changes have occurred over the past twenty-fiye years in the mar-
ket for corporate control. Prior to 1960, cash takeover bids were rare in the
United States. 16 Most corporate acquisitions were accomplished through
mergers or sales where incumbent managements were willing partners.1 7
No state directly regulated tender offers prior to the passage of the Williams
8. See generally Reuters Bus. Report, Sept. 23, 1987.
9. At least ten states have passed anti-takeover laws under circumstances similar to Wiscon-
sin's. See Butler, Corporate - Specific Anti-takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Char-
ters, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 365, 375 n.34.
10. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-100 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 101-65 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 123-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
16. See Note, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle Continues: Should States Regulate Only
Local Companies?, 60 IND. L.J. 721 (1985) [hereinafter, Note, Tender Offer Regulation]; Note,
Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133
(1974) [hereinafter, Note, Commerce Clause Limitations].
For an interesting examination of the history of Canadian takeover bids which in many re-
spects parallels the history of takeovers in the United States, see Gillen, Economic Efficiency and
Takeover Bid Regulation, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 919 (1986).
17. United States Dep't of Justice, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper (1986) [herein-
after Group Discussion Paper].
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Act in 1968,18 and little legislative activity occurred at the state level for
several years thereafter. 9 However, when the period of corporate conglom-
eration began, it became common for corporations to be acquired without
the approval or consent of management through tender offers z.2  Today,
although the total number of tender offers has declined, new financing tech-
niques have permitted hostile takeovers of large corporations.21
A. Examination of Tender Offers
A tender offer exists when the acquiring firm makes a direct public offer
to a target firm's stockholders in an effort to purchase the voting shares.22
Tender offers can be made for all the outstanding shares of a corporation or
for some specified number of outstanding shares which would result in a
controlling interest. Such offers are frequently open for only a limited time
- usually only a few days. In either event, tender offerors usually provide
tendering shareholders with substantial premiums over the current market
price.23 Studies have shown that stock price gains of target corporations in
successful tender offers averaged thirty percent, while successful mergers
averaged twenty percent.24 On the aggregate, shareholders have enjoyed a
gain of $400 billion in the 1980s due to hostile takeovers and takeover
threats.25
A tender offer in a takeover bid is usually more attractive than a merger
because it effectively bypasses incumbent management. Bidders recognize
18. The Virginia legislature passed the first state takeover statute in 1968 before the Williams
Act became effective. See Boyer, When it Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce
Clause and Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
539, 540 (1988). See generally Note, Tender Offer Regulation, supra note 16, at 721.
19. See Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987).
20. See Note, The Continuing Validity of State Takeover Statutes - A Limited Third Genera-
tion, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 412, 413 (1987).
21. See Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 457, 462 (1988).
22. Takeover attempts also involve exchange offers of securities. This is an important varia-
tion of the cash tender offer. The use of securities rather than cash in a takeover attempt requires
registration of the securities offered under the Securities Act of 1934. This process involves some
delay which is similar to the delay experienced as a result of the Williams Act.
23. See generally Group Discussion Paper, supra note 17, at 1. Typically, when there has been
a cash tender offer for a given stock, the open market price for that stock may also increase
dramatically. This may occur because the market anticipates that either a counter-offer above the
tender offer will be forthcoming or that the new management will improve the performance of the
corporation. Id.
24. Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong About Hostile Takeovers?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 353,
360.
25. Id. at 361.
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that cooperation by incumbent management may be withheld if managers
disapprove of the acquisition for any reason. Since a successful tender offer
may result in ousting the incumbent management by the offeror, the incum-
bent management may expend a great amount of corporate time and money
in an attempt to defeat the takeover. Since a merger without the support of
incumbent management is impossible, a tender offer is the most reasonable
alternative when there is a possibility that management will not be in favor
of the acquisition.
Tender offers are generally made where target management holds a
small ownership stake in the corporation. This phenomenon is due to the
fact that limited managerial ownership implies a greater likelihood of man-
agement inefficiencies.26 Additionally, in this type of situation, manage-
ment is unable to defeat a tender offer by simply withholding its shares.27 It
is often the bidding firm's sole intention to replace the incumbent manage-
ment with a management team that is more efficient and responsive to
stockholders' goals and therefore, more likely to increase the net worth of
the company.
Bidders also may find the corporation attractive for other legitimate rea-
sons. For example, some companies seek to acquire other corporations
through tender offers to increase the distribution of services and products.
2
Other bidders may recognize that a corporation's stock does not accurately
reflect the true value of the corporation or notice that corporate profits are
needlessly slipping. This type of corporation is particularly ripe for a hos-
tile takeover.
While an incumbent management team would often like to disrupt the
tender offer process, it may have an affirmative fiduciary duty to its share-
26. See generally Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment,
and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1985). A bidder may pay a
premium over the market price for a given stock if it believes that the target's management has not
been operating efficiently. The bidder's rationale is that the corporate assets are not being cor-
rectly utilized, and a more efficient management could earn a higher return on such assets. Those
justifying takeovers on this basis see them as a desirable phenomenon which benefits both the
bidder and the target's stockholders. Id.
Those opposed to takeovers, particularly hostile takeovers, downplay possible managerial inef-
ficiencies arising from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In-
stead, they argue that the tender offer prbcess coerces stockholders and leads to substantial costs,
both in the expenditure of managers' time and from the dissipation of corporate assets. Id.
27. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. Rlv. 111 (1987).
28. The corporation that acquired G. Heileman Company may have had an interest in ex-
panding its distribution channels. Mr. Paul Shain, a beer industry analyst with Dan Bosworth,
Inc., of Minneapolis, stated: "Beer is sold through wholesalers, distribution is highly unionized,
and it's not easy to break in with a new product." N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1987, § 1, at 31, col. 3.
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
holders to refrain from opposing a tender offer.2 9 If shareholders are to
realize a substantial premium for their shares from an accepted tender offer,
corporate goals may require management to resist the temptation of spend-
ing valuable corporate assets in an effort to defeat the tender offer. In some
cases, a proper exercise of management's authority should be directed to-
ward expediting rather than opposing the bidder's offer.3 ' Nevertheless, the
obvious and inherent conflict of interest between management and share-
holders makes management assistance unlikely. Given this inherent con-
flict, federal and state governments have enacted legislation to regulate the
takeover process.
B. Government Regulation of the Takeover Process
Over the last several decades, federal law has attempted to lay a suitable
foundation to protect shareholders from the ill-effects of hostile takeovers.
The emphasis of this federal legislation is to protect investors.3 This legis-
lation forces bidders to provide more information during the tender offer
process. As a result, these investors are able to make more intelligent and
informed decisions relating to the disposition of their shares. The legisla-
tion did not assign special protection to the bidders or the target
corporations.
In turn, as takeovers became more common, state politicians felt pres-
sure to protect the interests of local enterprises. Labor organizations, busi-
nessmen, and incumbent management became vocal against "corporate
raiders" taking over corporations without the consent of management. Be-
cause the states were saturated with anti-takeover bias, they responded by
enacting their own takeover laws which covered cash and other kinds of
tender offers.32
States soon recognized two potential problems with their attempt to reg-
ulate the takeover process. First, state regulation of the takeover process
29. One commentator has stated that the single goal of shareholder wealth maximization is
the clear benchmark against which management's performance may be assessed. See Eisenberg,
Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance - Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1, 6 (1983).
30. For a discussion in favor of legislation which would force managers to be passive in the
face of a takeover attempt, see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); see also Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819 (1981).
31. For further discussion of federal legislation aimed at the protection of investors, see infra
notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of state regulations relating to the takeover process, see infra notes 49-77
and accompanying text.
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often has a direct impact on commerce. Congress, not the state legislature,
is empowered with the constitutional right to regulate commerce among the
states.33 However, if Congress chooses not to directly regulate interstate
commerce in this context, there is nothing in the commerce clause which
explicitly prohibits states from doing so. Therefore, states may regulate the
takeover process unless such regulation significantly interferes with the na-
tional economy.34
Second, even if the state regulation does not significantly interfere with
interstate commerce, a state takeover statute may be preempted if it con-
flicts with other federal regulations.35 Since state laws generally tilt the
rules of tender offers in favor of target companies, such laws often conflict
with the federal government's primary tool for regulating the takeover pro-
cess, the Williams Act.
1. The Williams Act and Federal Regulation
The Williams Act is the major federal weapon against improper take-
over.36 It was adopted in 1968 and is technically an amendment to Sections
13 and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 ' The Williams Act
serves as a congressional response to the growing use of cash tender offers
as a means for achieving corporate takeovers.38
The bill was created to remedy a gap in federal regulation created by the
development of tender offers as a means of gaining corporate control. The
Act's major provisions are its advance disclosure requirements and its anti-
fraud provisions39 which were designed to give the target management
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. "Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Com-
merce ... among the several states ... ." Id.
34. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Cooley v. Board of Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824).
35. For a discussion of the preemption of state takeover regulations by the Williams Act, see
infra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
36. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1981)). For a discussion of the major provisions of the Williams
Act, see Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637
(1971); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal & State Regulations of Cash Tender
Offers, J. L. & ECON. 371 (1980); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects,
and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977).
37. Congress added §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
38. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
39. The Williams Act's disclosure regulations require bidding firms to file reports which de-
scribe the acquirer's business plans and sources of financing. The law's minimum tender offer
period provides that all offers must remain open for at least ten days, thus precluding the speedy
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standing to sue for injunctive relief.4 The original proposal41 evolved over
a two-year period in response to positions expressed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and other interested parties from private in-
dustry and the New York Stock Exchange.4"
One of the major principles enunciated in the history of the Williams
Act is Congress' intent that neither the bidder nor the target corporation's
management have an undue advantage over the other in the solicitation
process.43 The Act recognizes that the success or failure of the transactions
regulated by it should ultimately be determined by the shareholders of the
corporation whose shares are being sought. 4 The fundamental purpose be-
hind the Act is protection for the investor. The Act provides that investors
receive more information about the inquirer and more time to decide
whether or not to accept the tender.45
exchange of control that occurred on occasion before 1968. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 36, at
371-72.
In addition to disclosure requirements which protect all target shareholders, the Williams Act
provides other benefits for target shareholders who elect to tender their stock. First, stockholders
who accept the tender offer are given the right to withdraw their shares during the first seven days
of the tender offer and at any time after 60 days from the commencement of the offer. Second,
where the tender offer is for less than all outstanding shares and more than the requested number
of shares are tendered, the Act requires that the tendered securities be taken up pro rata by the
offeror during the first 10 days of the offer. Finally, the Act provides that if, during the course of
the offer, the amount paid for the target shares is increased, all tendering shareholders are to
receive the additional consideration even if they tendered their stock before the price increase was
announced. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5) - (7) (1982).
40. But see Piper, 430 U.S. at 1 (recovery for damages under Williams Act doubtful).
41. See generally supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42. 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (remarks by Sen. Williams).
43. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813 ("The Bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."); see also Piper, 430 U.S. at 2; S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (Williams Act
promotes a federal policy of neutrality in takeover contests).
44. As a result of the Williams Act, the average cash tender premiums increased from 32
percent before the Act to nearly 53 percent after its passage. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 36,
at 373.
45. It may be argued that disclosure provisions coupled with greater time for deliberations
allow target shareholders to make relatively better decisions. Senator Williams explained the pur-
pose of this Act:
Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulation in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of the bill is to require full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and manage-
ment equal opportunity to fairly present their case. This legislation will close a significant
gap in investor protection under the Federal Securities Laws by requiring the disclosure of
pertinent information to stockholders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation
by a cash tender offer.
[Vol. 72:434
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As enacted, the Williams Act requires takeover bidders to file a state-
ment with the SEC. This statement contains information relating to disclo-
sure, and includes the "background and identity" of the offeror, the source
and amount of funds or other considerations to be used in making the
purchases and the extent of the offeror's holdings in the target corporation's
business or corporate structure.46 A bill is currently pending in Congress
which will, if passed, require bidders to provide even broader and more
effective disclosure.47
As a result of the traditional state and corporate interest in regulating
the internal affairs of corporations, state legislatures and corporate manage-
ment seemed destined to develop devices which would avoid or minimize
the impact of the "ground rules of fair play" enunciated in the Williams
Act.4 8 Since the stakes are sufficiently high in this type of situation, inter-
ested parties are encouraged to gain any kind of advantage. However, if
any state statute frustrates the fulfillment of the free market approach of the
Federal Act, the Williams Act should preempt that state law.4 9
2. Pre-MITE State Regulation of the Takeover Process
After passage of the Williams Act, state legislators, quick to recognize
how disruptive takeovers could be to their constituencies, rallied to protect
their local industries from corporate raiders by promulgating takeover legis-
lation. These "first generation" statutes represented a new and fundamen-
tally different trend in state law.
113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 633 (1982); Piper, 430 U.S. at 35; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 3-4 (1967);
Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers: Legislating Within the Constitutional Framework, 54
FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 888 (1986); cf. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985);
Piper, 430 U.S. at 30-31; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 442 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). The Williams Act requires that the acquirer's information
statement be sent to the issuer and to each exchange on which the stock is traded. This statement
must also include information regarding the extent of stock ownership which the acquirer or any
associate has the right to acquire. If the acquirer's purpose is to gain control over the issuer, any
plans the acquirer may have to liquidate the issuer, sell its assets, merge it, or make any other
major change in its business or structure. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. and Trends
in Takeover Regulation, 30 THE CORP. J. 10 (Autumn 1987).
47. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
48. For a discussion of the innovations in corporation codes in recent history, see Romano,
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 225,
234 (1985).
49. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987); MITE Corp., 457
U.S. at 632-34; National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1982);
Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1418-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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A dramatic increase in the number of tender offers in 1975 led to a wave
of such state takeover regulation." Eighteen states passed takeover laws in
1976 and 1977. By 1980, thirty-seven states had adopted some form of
takeover law." These "first generation" statutes, enacted quicker than any
other innovations of this type in recent history, dramatically changed the
nature of the corporation code.5 2
Although first generation statutes paralleled certain basic elements of
the Williams Act, they tended to be much more stringent.5 3 For example,
every state with takeover regulation provided for a longer minimum period
than that required by the Act. Many statutes also required a disclosure
statement to be filed prior to public announcement of the tender offer,
rather than at the time of the announcement, as required by the Act. These
provided incumbent management with an unreasonable advantage by al-
lowing more time to implement defensive tactics.5 4
The SEC battled state anti-takeover devices by promulgating regula-
tions which either modified or eliminated the state statutes. The courts,
relying on preemption and the commerce clause, also responded to the state
anti-takeover statutes by systematically striking down state tender offer
laws. As statutes were modified to pass judicial scrutiny, the regulatory
scheme of tender offers became increasingly complex and courts were faced
with the difficult task of striking a balance between federal and state
regulations.
50. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 36, at 405. Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, and
South Dakota's takeover statutes all became effective in 1975. Eleven state laws became effective
in 1976 and ten additional statutes became effective in 1977. Id.
51. Many of these state statutes have been repealed since the MITE decision. See Warren,
Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW 671, 671-72
n.3 (1985); Note, Tender Offer Regulation, supra note 16, at 724-25 n.38; Note, The Unsung Death
of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REV. 1017 n.6 (1983).
52. See Romano, supra note 48, at 234.
53. For a comparison between Ohio's first generation takeover statute and the Williams Act,
see Note, supra note 45, at 887 n.16.
54. The advance filing and burdensome disclosure requirements added costs on the bidder
which tended to delay or halt a tender offer. See generally, Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30,
at 1161.
55. See All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act Release No. 23,241, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873
(July 17, 1986) (rule which overruled Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985)); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (March 28, 1984)
(statement of John Shad, Chairman, SEC), reprinted in (1983-84 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,511, 86,678 (1986); The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors 215
(1985).
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3. The Impact of Edgar v. MITE Corp.56
The supremacy clause of the Constitution provides Congress with the
power to preempt state law.57 Preemption occurs when the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of
Congress.58 An equally critical question in any preemption analysis is
whether Congress intended the federal regulation to supersede state law.5 9
There is no explicit indication that Congress intended the Act to completely
preempt state law. Thus, in judging the validity of state takeover statutes,
courts were left to determine if state laws were preempted by the Williams
Act.
It is well recognized that the "sole purpose of the Williams Act was the
protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer."60 A major
aspect of the Act is to protect investors by favoring neither management
nor the takeover bidder.61 The application of this neutral role has proven
difficult for the courts.
The judicial response to first generation statutes produced varied results.
Some courts declared the statutes invalid because they favored incumbent
management at the expense of the bidder and thus defeated the neutral posi-
tion established in the Williams Act. These courts held that the state stat-
utes were preempted by this Act. Other courts held that the takeover
statutes impaired the interstate market of corporate shares and thus vio-
lated the commerce clause. Some courts found both constitutional objec-
56. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
57. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT.
art. VI, cl. 2.
58. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Preemption occurs in other instances when: 1)
Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law when enacting a federal statute, see, e.g.,
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); 2) there is outright or
actual conflict between federal and state law, see, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); 3)
compliance with both federal and state law is, in effect, physically impossible, see, eg., Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963); 4) there is
implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85 (1983); and 5) Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of
regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, see, eg., Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, rev'd, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
59. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355,
363 (1986).
60. Piper, 430 U.S. at 35.
61. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633.
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tions.62 Still other courts upheld similar statutes.63 There were even
instances where certain laws were found valid by one court and invalid by
another. 4 This area of law remained in a confused state until 1982.
In 1982, the Supreme Court sent a strong message to state law-makers
by striking down an Illinois tender offer statute61 which favored the target
corporation over the bidder. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., a divided court 66
struck down a typical first generation state takeover statute,67 holding that
it was preempted by the Williams Act and unduly burdened interstate com-
merce in violation of the commerce clause. 6' The result of MITE was the
invalidation of thirty-seven state takeover laws.69 Justice White, writing for
the majority, stated that even though states may not regulate commerce
directly, they may indirectly use their powers so long as the "putative local
benefits" of the regulation do not outweigh the burden on interstate com-
merce.7" Further, the Court found the Illinois statute blocked a "nation-
wide tender offer." Thus, shareholders were deprived of the opportunity to
sell their shares at a premium and the reallocation of economic resources
62. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); National City Lines, Inc.,
687 F.2d at 1122; Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981); Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 57 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
63. See, e.g., Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 302 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. App. 1981); Sharon Steel Corp.
v. Whaland, 433 A.2d 1250 (N.H. 1981).
64. Compare Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) and AMCA Int'l
Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) with Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d
338 (Del. Ch. 1980) and Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D.
Ohio 1981).
65. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 624 (1982) (striking down Illinois Business Take-Over Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.521 (Supp. 1980) (repealed 1983)).
66. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-44. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens and
O'Connor joined Justice White's majority opinion holding that the Illinois Business Takeover Act
placed impermissible, indirect burdens on interstate commerce. Id.
The Court noted that although states may not regulate interstate commerce directly, they may
use their powers in ways that have an indirect burden on interstate commerce unless the burden
imposed on interstate commerce exceeds the "putative local benefits" of the regulation. Id. at 646.
67. See Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13 SEc.
REG. L.J. 332, 334 n.10 (1986).
68. For a discussion of the commerce clause and its role in the takeover process, see supra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
69. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 624; see also Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d
1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Virginia statute); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michi-
gan statute); National City Lanes v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri statute).
But see Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts stat-
ute upheld under supremacy clause challenge but remanded for assessment of commerce clause
claim).
70. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-44.
[Vol. 72:434
1989] TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
was hindered.71 The Mite decision initially sounded the "death knell" of
state authority in this area. However, resourceful legislators would only be
temporarily derailed.
4. Post-MITE State Takeover Laws
The MITE holding conceded that Congress did not explicitly prohibit
states from regulating takeovers. However, it did hold that such state legis-
lation could not conflict with the Williams Act.72 Without the fear of abso-
lute pre-emption, many states attempted to avoid the fate of the Illinois
statute by amending their statutes so as to withstand constitutional attack.73
Some states tried new approaches in seeking to control tender offers. These
71. Id. at 644.
72. Id. at 631. The Court stated: "Congress did not explicitly prohibit States from regulating
takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois statute conflicts with the Williams Act to
the courts. Of course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid
federal statute .... Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that he joined the
majority since "its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender
offers." Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
However, there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was aware of state take-
over laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only
Virginia had a takeover statute. The Virginia statute, Va. Code Sec. 13.1-528 (1978), became
effective March 5, 1968. The Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968.
See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
For a survey of the legislative responses to MITE, see Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant
Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 473, 478-82 (1987); Pozen, The
New Round of State Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 3 (1984); Sargent, Do the
Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REv. 3
(1985); Warren, supra note 51, at 694-700; Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Take-
over Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 203 (1987).
73. The holding in MITE appeared to do little in discouraging states from enacting anti-
takeover statutes. Within the four years of the decision, new takeover laws were adopted in
twenty-one states. Not surprisingly, a state's adoption of a second generation statute is strongly
correlated with its having had a first generation statute. See Romano, supra note 27, at 111. See
generally Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The Maryland,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REv. 731 (1986); Garrity, Addendum: Post-Mite
State Takeover Statutes: Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 42 Bus. LAW. 586 (1987); Pozen,
supra note 72, at 89; Note, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: The Door Has Surprisingly
Been Opened For Valid State Takeover Legislation, 19 UNIV. OF TOL. L. Rnv. 683, 693 (1988).
Ohio was the first state to pass anti-takeover legislation designed to avoid the problems found
in MITE. Ohio's Control Share Acquisition Act is conceptually and essentially the same as the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act found constitutional in CTS Corp.. Ohio's Act, not sur-
prisingly, was challenged on the same basis as was the Indiana Act that same summer. However,
the Ohio Act was struck down on the same grounds the Seventh Circuit used to strike down the
Indiana Act. For a discussion of the Court's holding in CTS Corp., see infra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
post-MITE statutes are generally referred to as "second generation" take-
over statutes.74
Second generation takeover statutes have attempted to circumvent the
commerce clause problems identified in the MITE decision by being less
burdensome on interstate commerce. These statutes are generally applica-
ble only to corporations which are domestically incorporated or have a sub-
stantial number of assets or shareholders in the state.75
Unlike the pre-MITE statutes, these statutes focus on the traditional
state concerns relating to the relationship between the target of the takeover
and the state. The internal affairs of the corporation and rights of share-
holders became more important than the tender process itself.76 Using the
internal affairs doctrine,77 legislators sought to protect their citizens against
adverse impact on state economics and regulate the internal affairs of their
74. First generation statutes generally give state officials broad power in requiring additional
disclosure beyond that required by the Williams Act. Second generation statutes can be distin-
guished in that they usually attempt to provide that all shareholders receive equivalent payments,
or require that a shareholder vote upon acquisition of a certain percentage of shares to authorize
either the purchase of their shares or other acquisitions. See Pinto, supra note 71, at 473; Sargent,
supra note 72, at 3; see also Warren, supra note 72, at 671.
75. For example, the second generation takeover statute enacted by Indiana is limited to
corporations incorporated in Indiana and having at least ten percent of the shareholders and its
principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets within the state of Indiana. See
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (Burns Supp. 1987); MD. CORPS. & AS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-
102(a), 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (statute applies to every Maryland corporation); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(13) (McKinney 1987) (statute limited to corporations organized under
New York law and having significant business operations, their principal executive offices and at
least ten percent of voting stock beneficially owned by New York residents).
76. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle that generally applies the law of
the state of incorporation to matters that involve the relationship among shareholders, managers,
and directors of a corporation. Section 302(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
states the following:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues, except
in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CO4FLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471, 478 (1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1933).
The only areas where federal law actively regulates the internal affairs of corporations are the
proxy statement requirements, which are designed to facilitate intelligent voting decisions. See,
e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 140.41a-3 (1985).
77. See generally Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doc-
trine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 29 (1987); Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legis-
lation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3
(1984).
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corporations. At least thirty-two states have enacted some variation of the
second generation statute in an effort to protect domestic corporations.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECOND GENERATION
TAKEOVER STATUTES
Second generation takeover statutes differ with respect to their design
and effect. Most second generation statutes are fashioned to shield manage-
ment from undesired takeovers and are generally categorized into two
types. The first type seeks to enlarge shareholder voting rights regarding
matters which affect the corporation (shareholder enhancers). The second
type strengthens the position of incumbent management (management en-
hancers). The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a
shareholder enhancer statute,78 but has not addressed the constitutionality
of a management enhancer statute.
A. Shareholder Enhancer Statutes
1. Characteristics of Shareholder Enhancer Statutes
Shareholder enhancer statutes assist shareholders in the takeover pro-
cess. An example is the control share acquisition statute ("CSA"). 79 CSA
statutes condition voting rights of "control shares" upon majority approval
of the target company's disinterested shareholders. Control shares are
those which bring the offeror's voting power in an issuing corporation to or
above certain threshold levels. Most CSA statutes define control shares as
those which give an offeror at least twenty percent of the target company's
voting stock. 0 Shareholders then have the benefit of deciding whether or
not the control shares will have their rights restored.
In addition to enhancing the shareholder's position, CSA statutes also
benefit management by providing a longer waiting period which may defeat
a tender offer. Currently, sixteen states have enacted some form of the CSA
statute.8 ' The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the consti-
78. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
79. See Hanks, Maryland-Type Takeover Statutes: Are They 'Fair Price'or Foul Ball?, NAT'L
L.J. (Sept. 8, 1986); Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act I, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 108 (1983).
80. See Bloomenthal, Control Share Acquisition and Shareholder Protection Acts (Part II),
Sec. & Fed. Corp. Rep. (Sept. 8, 1987).
81. As of January 1, 1988 the following states had adopted some form of the control share
acquisition statute: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1217 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.109 to .247 (West Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 415-171 to -172, 416-73 (1985);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -42-11 (Bums Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to
:140.2 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (West Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN.
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tutionality of Indiana's CSA statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America.82
2. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
The CTS Corp. decision marked a turnabout from the ruling in MITE
and put bidders on the defensive.83 In a six to three decision, the Court
upheld an Indiana statute which benefited stockholders. 4 Despite the ben-
efits accruing to stockholders, some commentators have criticized the
Court's holding in CTS Corp."
In its decision, the Court determined that the Indiana Act was constitu-
tionally sound under the commerce clause analysis for several reasons.
First, the Court found that nothing in the Indiana Act imposed a greater
burden on out-of-state offerors than on a similarly situated Indiana of-
feror.86 Second, the Court determined that the statute did not create an
impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different states.87 The de-
fendant's argument that the statute was unconstitutional because it would
limit the number of successful tender offers was flatly rejected by the
Court.88 Rather, the Court found that the statute provided only regulatory
LAWS ANN. ch. 1 10C, §§ 1-7 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.01 1,
302A.449, 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.015, 351.407 (Vernon
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79 (1987); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 78.378 to .12 (1987 &
Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5
(1987).
82. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
83. Id.
84. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 through 23-1-42-11 (Michie Supp. 1986). The Indiana law
provides that an acquirer of 20 percent, 33 1/3 percent, or 50 percent of an Indiana company's
shares must win approval of a majority of the outstanding shares and a majority of the disinter-
ested outstanding shares before it can exercise the voting rights of the control stake. Thus, the
mere acquisition of "control shares" does not ensure voting control.
If the acquirer requests a meeting to vote on the control share acquisition, the acquirer must
bear the expense of the meeting. The meeting must be held within 50 days if the acquirer files an
acquiring person statement, requests the meeting and agrees to pay the expenses. If voting rights
are not approved by the shareholders, the company may redeem the acquirer's shares at market
value. If the acquirer does not file an acquiring person statement, the company may redeem the
shares 60 days after the control share acquisition.
The law applies only to businesses that: (1) are incorporated in Indiana with more than 100
shareholders; (2) have either their principal place of business, their principal offices or substantial
assets in Indiana; and (3) have either more than ten percent of their total shareholders in Indiana,
more than ten percent of their shares held by Indiana residents or 10,000 shareholders residing in
Indiana. See Pamepinto & Heard, New State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
21, 1987, at 26, col. 4.
85. See generally Langevoort, supra note 19, at 96.
86. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88.
87. Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 95.
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procedures which were designed for the protection of the corporation's
shareholders. The statute did not prohibit any entity, either resident or
nonresident, from offering to purchase, purchasing shares in Indiana corpo-
rations, or from attempting to thereby gain control. 9
Justice Powell, writing for the majority,9" stated that the Court was not
bound by the reasoning in MITE.91 On this basis, the CTS Corp. Court
held that the Indiana law did not create a conflict with either the commerce
clause or the Williams Act.92 The Court construed the Act to provide only
limited protections to target shareholders as it no longer appeared to be
willing to use the Act as a comprehensive statement on tender offers. 9 3
At least with respect to shareholder enhancer statutes, the CTS Corp.
holding appears to mark the Court's abandonment of the protected status of
takeovers under federal law. This decision is viewed as a sweeping affirma-
tion of states' rights in this area. Today, there exists a relatively hospitable
legal environment which allows unfettered state anti-takeover legislation.
Thirteen states have either adopted or proposed anti-takeover statutes
modeled after the Indiana law and assuredly the number will increase in the
future.9' States are once again becoming active in the regulatory process
affecting takeover bids.95
B. Management Enhancer Statutes
Some state statutes have been enacted which significantly enhance man-
agement's position in the takeover process. These statutes are referred to as
89. Id.
90. Id. Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Id.
91. Id. Justice Powell stated:
As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the Court,
we are not bound by its reasoning. We need not question that reasoning, however, because
we believe the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad interpretation of the Wil-
liams Act articulated by Justice White in MITE.
Id. at 80. (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 82-86.
93. Id. The majority opinion held that the Indiana law conflicted with neither the language
nor the purpose of the Williams Act. The Court stated that "[i]t is entirely possible for entities to
comply with both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act." Id. at 79. Thus, the state statute "can
be preempted only if it frustrates the purposes of the federal law." Id.
94. See Barrett, Delaware Moves Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers, Wall St.
J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 37, col. 4.
95. For a discussion of the politics behind enactment of state takeover legislation, see Ro-
mano, State Takeover Laws: Constitutional but Dumb, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 28, col. 4.
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"business combination statutes."9 6 This statutory model originated in New
York and is significantly different from other schemes because it does not
restrict the bidder's ability to acquire and use shares.9 7 Under this statutory
model, if a shareholder acquires a certain percentage of stock in a corpora-
tion, that shareholder must receive director approval before it seeks a busi-
ness combination or purchases additional shares.98 Although "business
combinations" referred to in these statutes are generally defined broadly,
business combinations often involve transactions in which certain share-
holders attempt to completely control the corporation or attempt to use
corporate assets to finance its acquisition through leverage.
The disturbing aspect of business combination statutes is that corporate
boards have the right to unilaterally block hostile takeovers. Critics point
out that business combination statutes act as a vehicle which allows man-
agement to entrench itself in their corporate positions, thus becoming virtu-
ally immune from the threat of takeover.99 This is particularly troublesome
in light of the traditional roles of management and shareholders in the cor-
porate scheme. Such a position deprives investors of beneficial restructur-
ings or changes in control and encourages management self-dealing.
Supporters of management enhancer statutes claim that the statutes
should be shielded from constitutional scrutiny because they deal with the
"internal affairs" of the corporation. 100 These supporters further assert that
such statutes ensure management's right to remain in their positions to run
the corporation in the most efficient fashion. They therefore provide share-
holders with the benefit of the full economic potential from their invest-
ment. These business combination statutes have yet to be tested in the
United States Supreme Court.
96. For a discussion of Wisconsin's business combination statute, see Davis, An Evaluation:
Wisconsin's New Business Combination Statute, 61 Wis. BAR BULL., Feb. 1988, at 13; see also
infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
97. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). For an examination of the New York
law, see Pinto & McGrath, Problems and Issues Raised in State's New Takeover Law, N.Y.L.J.,
March 17, 1986, at 21 (1986); Pinto, NY Law, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 1; see also
Note, The Constitutionality of State Business Combination Legislation: New York's Section 912, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 1025 (1987).
For a discussion of Wisconsin's business combination statute, see infra notes 101-22 and ac-
companying text.
98. Under New York law, a bidder is required to obtain board approval when owning 20% of
the voting stock. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(10).
99. See Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
100. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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IV. WISCONSIN'S "BusINESS COMBINATION" ANTI-TAKEOVER
STATUTE
The legislative intent behind Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute was to
promote the welfare of ongoing business operations, shareholders, employ-
ees, customers, suppliers and local communities. 01 The statute is modeled
after the New York takeover statute" 2 which has been followed by several
other states. 10 3 Although the Heileman takeover was the focal point in
passing this legislation, the law applies to all "resident domestic corpora-
tions" of Wisconsin.10 4
The anti-takeover statute has the effect of deterring virtually all tender
offers for Wisconsin companies. In cases of attempted merger between an
offeror and a Wisconsin corporation, the merger is prohibited for a period
of three years with a single exception. That exception requires the board of
directors of the target company to approve the transaction in advance of the
acquisition of ten percent of the company's shares. Assuming no entrench-
ment bias, the anti-takeover statute assigns incumbent management the
ability to be an insurmountable obstacle.
A. Provisions of Wisconsin's Takeover Statute - Wisconsin
Statute § 180.726
Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute creates an absolute bar against certain
"business combinations" involving "resident domestic corporations" for a
period of three years from the interested stockholder's stock acquisition
date.'05 The business combination is only possible if the incumbent board
of directors approves the transaction prior to the date on which the inter-
ested stockholder acquires ten percent or more of the corporation's stock.
The shareholders are not provided the opportunity to decide if a tender
offer may proceed when the tender offer contemplates a subsequent business
combination with the offeror. Thus, this "standstill provision" operates to
disenfranchise shareholders who are presented with opportunities through a
tender offer which have not been approved by the incumbent directors.
Management is left with the unilateral authority to reject or accept the offer
irrespective of shareholder's wishes.
101. See WIs. STAT. § 180.726(1)(2) (1987).
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397(3) (Baldwin 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
1-43 (Burns Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
104. Wis. STAT. § 180.726(1)(1) (1988).
105. Id. at § 180.726(2).
1989]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The statute broadly defines a "resident domestic corporation" as a do-
mestic corporation which satisfies any of the following:
a) Its principal executive offices are located in this state; b) It has
significant business operations located in this state; c) More than ten
percent of the holders of record of its shares are residents of this
state; d) More than 10% of its shares are held of record by residents
of this state.
10 6
The definition of "business combination" is equally broad in the Wis-
consin statute. An interested stockholder is defined in the Act as a person
who owns or controls ten percent or more of the voting power of a resident
domestic corporation. 107 The Act generally defines six situations which af-
fect the corporation and involve interested shareholders.
First, the law covers merger or consolidation of a resident domestic cor-
poration or a subsidiary, with an interested stockholder or an associate of
the interested stockholder.'08 Second, it applies in situations where the dis-
position of assets represents five percent or more of the earning power or
income of a resident domestic corporation, or a subsidiary, to an interested
shareholder or an affiliate or associate of the interested stockholder.1° 9
Third, the law applies to the issuance or transfer of stock by a resident
domestic corporation under certain circumstances. 110 Fourth, the law ap-
plies to plans which liquidate or dissolve the resident domestic corporation
involving an interested stockholder or an affiliate or associate.'1 ' Fifth, it
applies to certain transactions which increase ownership of the outstanding
stock by the interested stockholder. 12 Finally, the law applies where the
interested stockholder or its affiliate or associate benefits from certain types
of financial assistance or tax benefits provided by or through the resident
corporation. 1
13
After expiration of the three-year statutory period, the interested share-
holder may engage in a business combination with the corporation only if
certain conditions are met." 4 First, the board of directors of the resident
domestic corporation must give prior approval. Second, the majority of the
holders of the domestic corporation's voting stock, excluding stock benefi-
cially owned by the interested stockholder, must approve the business com-
106. Id. at § 180.726(l)(1)la-d.
107. Id. at § 180.726(1)0)1.
108. Id. at § 180.726(l)(e)l(a)-(b).
109. Wis. Stat. § 180.726(1)(e)2(a)-(c) (1987).
110. Id. at § 180.726(1)(e)3(a)-(b).
111. Id. at § 180.726(1)(e)4.
112. Id. at § 180.726(1)(e)5(a)-(d).
113. Id. at § 180.726(1)(e)6.
114. Id. at § 180.726(3).
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bination. Third, the corporation's stockholders, other than the interested
stockholder, are entitled to receive a minimum price per share. However,
the consideration paid to stockholders must be in cash or in the same form
that the interested stockholder used to acquire its shares.115
Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, the Wisconsin
takeover statute does not apply to a business combination in a number of
circumstances. 1 6 For example, the statute does not apply if the corpora-
tion does not have voting stock registered or traded on a national exchange
or registered under federal securities laws." 7 Additionally, it also does not
apply if the interested stockholder acquired ten percent of the voting stock
in the resident domestic corporation before September 10, 1987, and had
not subsequently increased its shares of voting power in any amount not
approved by the board of directors before the additional voting power was
acquired.1 8
The law provides that, without the approval of a majority of stockhold-
ers, no premiums can be paid to anyone holding over three percent of the
stock over the past two years if the corporation is attempting to acquire five
percent or more of the stock during the takeover offer.1 19 In addition, ma-
jority approval is needed before the board may transfer or sell ten percent
or more of the company's assets. However, that figure may be exceeded if
the corporation has at least three independent directors and the majority of
those directors vote to exceed that limit.
1 20
Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute has the intended and actual effect of
preventing the successful consummation of business transactions including,
but not limited to, tender offers. The term "business combination" is so
broadly defined that it precludes more than just mergers or consolidations
with an interested stockholder. The statute precludes liquidation, recapital-
ization, sale, lease, exchange, mortgage or pledge of ten percent or more of
the resident domestic corporation's assets to or with the interested stock-
holder. Further, the statute precludes the receipt of any financial assistance
or benefit, tax credit or tax advantage, except in proportion to any benefit or
advantage received by other shareholders.1 2
1
The Wisconsin anti-takeover statute effectively precludes the necessary
business transactions critical to the success of tender offers for control of a
115. Id. at § 180.726(3)(c)2.
116. Id. at § 180.726(5).
117. Id. at § 180.726(5)(a).
118. Id. at § 180.726(5)(d).
119. Id. at § 180.725(5)(a).
120. Id. at § 180.725(5)(b)2.
121. Id. at § 180.726(1)(e).
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Wisconsin corporation. In its present form, all tender offers which are not
approved by incumbent management of resident domestic corporations will
be defeated. The practical impact of this law is that shareholders will be
deprived of the opportunity to tender their shares in a hostile takeover at-
tempt. This is true no matter how high the premium offered. In its present
form, the statute does not have a provision allowing shareholders to "opt
out" of or avoid the prohibitions imposed by the statute. Instead, the stat-
ute vests in the incumbent directors, who are themselves ongoing contend-
ers in a contest for corporate control, the power to determine whether
shareholders should be given the opportunity to consider the merits of a
tender offer.
Wisconsin's statute abrogates to management the fundamental right of
shareholders to determine for themselves whether to sell their shares pursu-
ant to a tender offer. It should come as little surprise to the drafters of this
legislation that the statute, if challenged, will be held unconstitutional in its
present form.122
B. The Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Takeover Statute
The Wisconsin takeover statute, as written, is unconstitutional because
it is preempted by the Williams Act and interferes with interstate com-
merce. Unless the Wisconsin statute is modified, it is not likely to receive
the favorable treatment enjoyed by the Indiana statute in CTS Corp. The
statute will fail because it removes from the shareholders the ability to make
their own investment decisions in direct violation of the intent of the Wil-
liams Act.
1. Wisconsin's Takeover Statute Preempted by the Williams Act
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides Con-
gress with the power to pre-empt state law. 23 Even in the absence of ex-
press Congressional intent to pre-empt state law,124 a state statute will be
preempted where it conflicts with federal law. A conflict between federal
and state law can be found where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
122. In RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., a federal district court reviewed Wisconsin's
anti-takeover statute and held that the legislation frustrated the shareholder welfare purpose of
the Williams Act and was pre-empted. Unpublished Memorandum Decision and Order, No. 88-
C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988). However, the district court later vacated its decision after the
case was settled. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,789 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 1988).
123. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
124. For an example of Congress' intent to pre-empt state law, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). Examples of statutes that include an express pre-emption provi-
sion are cited in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185-86 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."' 25 In such cases, state regulation in a particular area is not wholly
superseded, but only "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law." 126
There is no question that when Congress constructed the comprehensive
federal legislation regulating tender offers, it intended to protect inves-
tors. 1 27 Clearly, a major goal of the Williams Act is protection of investors
through neutral treatment of management and the takeover bidder.'28 The
Williams Act intended to leave the determination of the success or failure of
the transactions the Act regulates to the informed and free investment judg-
ment of the shareholders of the corporation. Since a state law will be pre-
empted by the Williams Act if it frustrates the purpose of Congress, the
critical issue is whether an actual conflict exists between federal and state
law.
Wisconsin's business combination statute is exceedingly pro-manage-
ment. This is true despite the fact that it imposes severe restrictions on
post-tender offer transactions which have not been approved by incumbent
management. In most takeover bids, post-tender offer transactions are cru-
cial to a successful takeover by tender offer, thus the statute delivers to
incumbent management the power to block various business combinations
for three years without shareholder consideration. The Wisconsin legisla-
tion vests all power in management and leaves nothing for shareholders.
This clearly upsets the neutral balance between target management and the
tender offeror and should be the basis for pre-emption.
Also, the three year "freezeout" period given to management is clearly
unreasonable. Unlike the Indiana Act in CTS Corp.,129 shareholders cannot
relieve the bidder of the disabilities of the statute to facilitate an attractive
offer. Wisconsin's freezeout period is similar in effect to a provision found
unconstitutional in MITE. 3 This aspect of the Wisconsin legislation alone
may also merit pre-emption.
125. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); accord CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communication Comm'n,
476 U.S. 355 (1986); Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
126. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973).
127. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
130. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637. In MITE, the plurality criticized a feature of the Illinois statute
which provided for a hearing on the tender offer but set no deadlines. The Court recognized that
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The Wisconsin statute inexcusably fails to incorporate provisions which
would require target management to justify the basis of their opposition to a
given bidder. Thus, investors are not only "gagged" in the corporation's
discussion of the propriety of takeover but may be blindfolded as well. This
not only disrupts the informational balance between interested parties, but
it further frustrates the design of the Williams Act. This is particularly
alarming, if one accepts the contention that takeovers occur primarily to
weed out management with sub-optimal performance. A major aspect of
the Williams Act was to provide investors with vital information regarding
transactions which affect the corporation.
Wisconsin's statute, when combined with the business judgment rule13 1
and its presumption of good faith, elevates management's position beyond
the reach of any interested party. As a result of management's preferential
position, any post hoc rationale for fixed and self-serving decisions volunta-
rily offered by incumbent management for resisting takeover will be
protected.
Advocates of Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute may assert that Wiscon-
sin was legislating within an area of traditional state interest: the regulation
of the "internal affairs" of domestic corporations. However, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the internal affairs doctrine "ap-
pears to be based more on the need for a uniform and certain standard to
govern the internal affairs of a corporation than on the perceived interest of
this gave management "'a powerful weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover.'" Id. at 637. De-
lay, said the Court, can "'seriously impede a tender offer.'" Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE, 633
F.2d 486, 494 (1980)).
131. The business judgment rule generally defines the fiduciary responsibilities of managers
and the circumstances under which they can take certain actions. The rule comes into play be-
cause the judiciary has recognized that it is ill-equipped to assess the quality of management
judgments. Thus, courts are reluctant to review the acts of directors in situations where the direc-
tors apply their expertise and the court is lacking in such expertise. Accordingly, the courts will
presume good faith on the part of management. See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1983). Cf. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l., Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th
Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2nd Cir.
1980) (applying New York law); Berman v. Gerber Products, 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich.
1978) (applying Michigan law); see also Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need For Re-
form, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
Nevertheless, some courts are skeptical of the rule's presumption of good faith regarding
tender offers. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a director had an interest in the transaction at
issue, the burden of proof shifts to the director to prove that the transaction was fair and reason-
able to the corporation. See Treadway Companies, Inc., v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying New Jersey law). It has been said that "regardless of their technical 'indepen-
dence,' directors of a target corporation are in a very special position, where the slavish applica-
tion of the majority's version of the good faith presumption is particularly disturbing." Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 301 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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the state of incorporation." 132 Thus, the internal affairs doctrine provides
no basis to place state takeover laws beyond the parameters of the Williams
Act. The fact that this statute has been lodged within Wisconsin's Corpora-
tion Law will not make this statute lawful.
Although the Court in CTS Corp. did note that if the Williams Act
"were construed to pre-empt any state statute that may limit or delay the
free exercise of power after a successful tender offer," a wide variety of
traditional state corporate laws would be pre-empted. 133 In CTS Corp., the
Court adopted neither the broad notion of federal pre-emption, nor the con-
verse proposition that all state corporate laws necessarily survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.1 34
The contrast between the Wisconsin takeover statute and the Williams
Act is apparent. The powerful tool furnished to target management is pre-
cisely what Congress intended to avoid, and for this reason, the Wisconsin
takeover statute clearly frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act. Ac-
cordingly, compliance with both the Williams Act and the Wisconsin stat-
ute is impossible. Thus, the Wisconsin statute is not likely to pass
constitutional muster.
2. Wisconsin's Takeover Statute Violates the Commerce Clause
Although the United States Constitution clearly gives Congress author-
ity to regulate commerce,1 35 it does not explicitly restrict the states from
doing so when Congress has not chosen to regulate in a certain area. This
leaves the determination of the states' roles in regulating interstate com-
merce to the Supreme Court.1 36
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has applied a two-tiered approach in
analyzing state economic regulation under the commerce clause. The
Court has held that "[w]hen a state statute directly regulates or discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state eco-
nomic interests over out-of-state interests" the statute will be struck down
without further inquiry.1 37 However, when a statute only has indirect ef-
fects on interstate commerce and regulates even-handedly, an analysis is
utilized which attempts to balance the local benefits of the statute against
132. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977).
133. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added).
134. See Buxbaum, supra note 77; Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs:
Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1958).
135. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
136. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
137. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 577
(1986).
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any incidental burdens the statute might impose on interstate commerce. 138
The Supreme Court applied this balancing test in MITE, 39 determining
that the state's asserted interests were "insufficient to outweigh the burdens
Illinois imposes on interstate commerce.''4°
However, the Supreme Court may have shifted its approach in order to
evaluate state takeover statutes which pass constitutional muster. 41  For
example, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics, the Court was presented with a statute
which conditioned acquisition of control in the corporation on approval of a
majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders (shareholder en-
hancer). The analysis the Court developed may have to be addressed in
addition to the traditional commerce clause analysis.
a. The Traditional Pike Test
In 1970, a unanimous Supreme Court developed a balancing test to be
used to resolve issues of the commerce clause. Derived from Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,4 z this test provided:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.143
Under this traditional test, the burden imposed on interstate commerce
by a state statute must not be excessive in relation to the local interests
served by the statute.'" Thus, an examination of the interests to be served
by the enactment of Wisconsin's takeover statute and the burdens it im-
poses is necessary.
138. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
139. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
140. Id. at 644.
141. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 69.
142. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
143. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)).
144. Commentators recognize that the "local interests served" by anti-takeover statutes are
not the motivating force behind the statute's enactment. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case For
Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435;
Johnson & Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16
SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989).
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i. Local Interests Served
Various groups' interests would be served by maintaining the status of
corporations through anti-takeover statutes such as the one enacted in Wis-
consin. Such interested groups include target corporations and their man-
agement, suppliers, corporate lawyers representing target corporations and
organized labor and party groups. 145 The interests preventing a takeover
have a particularly dominating influence where the ramifications of a take-
over would have some detrimental economic effect on a community.
This is especially true in communities where a well-known employer is
threatened by a takeover bid or where unemployment or slower economic
growth exists. The possibility of plant closings, bust-ups, 146 lay-offs, or
movement of jobs to distant states tends to broaden the base of opposition
to takeovers and promote the development of state legislative strategy.1 47
However, a unanimous Supreme Court has held that mere protection of
local economic interests is generally an impermissible purpose under the
commerce clause.1 48 The courts generally will strike down a statute that
regulates interstate commerce directly, discriminates against interstate com-
merce, or favors state economic interests over out-of-state interests. 149
If Wisconsin's true purpose is the protection of investors from being
coerced into accepting tender offers that are abusive, there is little doubt
that legislation could be passed which would achieve that purpose without
utterly thwarting all nationwide tender offers for Wisconsin companies.
Legislation should provide for a collective decision-making process through
145. Both houses of the legislature, the local unions representing Heileman, the state AFL-
CIO and the mayor of LaCrosse all pushed for Wisconsin's anti-takeover legislation. See Davis,
Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 491,
496-97. See generally Romano, supra note 27, at 13.
146. "Bust-up" generally refers to a takeover where the bidder seeks to finance the acquisition
by selling off pieces of the target company. The Court has examined this phenomenon in its
discussion of the Williams Act. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
147. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 2.
148. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980). In Lewis, the Court
succinctly articulated:
In almost any Commerce Clause case it would be possible for a State to argue that it has an
interest in bolstering local ownership, or wealth, or control of business enterprise. Yet
these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce Clause prohibits
a State from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside
competition.
Id. at 43-44; accord Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 532-39; see also, Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282-86 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). See generally Note, Securities Regu-
lation - Pre-emption, 13 GA. L. REV. 265 (1978); Note, Idaho Takeover Laws Held Unconstitu-
tional, 14 IDAHo L. REV. 521 (1978).
149. Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 577.
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the shareholder vote. Thus, shareholders could protect themselves without
the imposition of excessive, unnecessary and unconstitutional burdens on
interstate commerce manifest in Wisconsin's anti-takeover law.
iL The Burdens Imposed on Interstate Commerce
The most obvious burden the Wisconsin Act imposes on interstate com-
merce arises from the statute's nationwide effect on investors. The purpose
and effect of Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute is to deter the successful con-
summation of most nationwide tender offers for publicly held Wisconsin
companies. Because of the anti-takeover statute, investors in Wisconsin and
other states who own stock are deprived of the opportunity to benefit from
stock premiums, improved efficiency of management, and the reallocation
of economic resources to their highest valued use.
The anti-takeover statute's three year freeze-out period is directly harm-
ful to investors.15 This lengthy waiting period will hurt stockholders by
decreasing the overall number of takeover bids made for Wisconsin compa-
nies. 151 This would have a direct impact on the shareholders' opportunities
to sell their shares. The result would be a direct restraint on interstate com-
merce through the regulation of stock transactions in interstate
commerce. 152
Other factors which must be considered are alternate protections to
shareholders. The Supreme Court has held that "the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend [upon] ... whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."' 53 State
takeover statutes of the business combination variety such as the one passed
in Wisconsin should be found unconstitutional because they are not neces-
sary. In fact, most anti-takeover statutes codify the same "self help" defen-
sive tactics that firms can adopt in their corporate charter by majority
150. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
151. But see CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93-94. In his discussion of the merits of the Indiana
statute, Justice Powell concluded that the statute would be valid under the commerce clause
whether or not it had the effect of decreasing the number of tender offers for Indiana Corpora-
tions. Id.
152. Id. This author finds Justice White's dissent in CTS Corp. more persuasive. Justice
White concluded that Indiana's anti-takeover statute violated the commerce clause because it
imposed a direct restraint on interstate commerce by regulating the purchase and sale of stock in
interstate commerce. Id. at 97-101 (White, J., dissenting).
153. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); see also Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) ("the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interests involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
[Vol. 72:434
1989] TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
shareholder vote. Shareholder adoption of such measures is also more in
conformity with traditional notions of corporate governance.' 54
In conclusion, the burdens of the Wisconsin takeover statute under the
traditional Pike analysis outweigh the state's interest in protecting inter-
ested parties within the state of Wisconsin. Therefore, if challenged under
this commerce clause test, the statute is not likely to pass constitutional
muster.
b. The CTS Corp. Test
The Supreme Court, in CTS Corp., first noted that the "principal objects
of dormant commerce clause scrutiny are statutes, that discriminate against
interstate commerce." '5  Thus, regulation must be dispensed even-
handedly and cannot discriminate against interstate commerce. Second, the
Court observed that state regulations have been invalidated which "ad-
versely may affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsis-
tent regulations."1 56
Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute passes the first prong of the CTS Corp.
test 157 as it applies equally to both intrastate and interstate offerors.1 58 The
154. Management has at its disposal a great arsenal to fight off tender offers. Tactics used by
management to thwart hostile takeover include: 1) the "reverse bear-hug," where the target re-
sponds to the offer by expressing a willingness to negotiate but only at a prohibitively high price;
2) the "sandbag," where the target delays the offer by engaging in bad-faith negotiations; 3) the
"show-stopper," a lawsuit seeking an injunction barring the offer, usuaily on the ground that the
merger violates antitrust laws; 4) the "white knight," where a bidder comes to the "rescue" of the
target; 5) the "scorched earth," a defense that seeks to convince the acquirer that the target will
not be worth acquiring if the offer continues, typically because the target firm will sell its "crown
jewels." See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 26, at 1257; Carney, Controlling Management Oppor-
tunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385; see
also Herzel, Schmidt, & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3
CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980).
For a discussion of case law surrounding various anti-takeover tactics utilized by management,
see generally Gearhart Indus., 741 F.2d at 707 (sale of discounted subordinate debentures contain-
ing springing warrants); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. and Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
1984) (amendment to by-laws); Panter v. Marshall Field, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (acquisi-
tions to create antitrust problems); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981) (refusal to tender); Treadway v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980)
(sale to white knight); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) (sale of
stock to favored party).
Managerial defensive tactics, which use valuable corporate assets, may be inefficient as they
tend to increase the costs of successful tender offers. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 30, at
1161.
155. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87.
156. Id. at 88.
157. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
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statute imposes no greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on
similarly-situated offerors in Wisconsin. This does not result in discrimina-
tion to foreign bidders. Therefore, further analysis dedicated to this portion
of the test is unnecessary. However, because Wisconsin's anti-takeover stat-
ute will adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to in-
consistent regulation, the statute violates the second prong of the CTS Corp.
test.
Wisconsin's business combination takeover statute defines "resident do-
mestic corporations" in such a manner so as to include corporations which
were not incorporated in Wisconsin.'59 Wisconsin's anti-takeover statute
would apply to a Wisconsin corporation with "significant business opera-
tions" in the state even though there may be no Wisconsin resident share-
holders. However, Wisconsin's desire to protect local constituencies at the
expense of the interstate market in securities is impermissible. 6
The anti-takeover statute imposes restrictions upon certain post-acquisi-
tion transactions and asset transfers. These broad restrictions appear to ap-
ply even to the consolidation of out-of-state operations which is per se
illegal. 16
Unlike the Indiana statute upheld in CTS Corp., Wisconsin's anti-take-
over statute could operate to bar transactions with companies whose con-
nection to Wisconsin is limited to the involvement of operating units within
Wisconsin borders. This may subject corporations with interests in Wis-
consin to both the regulations of Wisconsin and their state of incorporation
which also could have a legitimate interest in regulating takeover bids.
Thus, the Wisconsin statute poses a significant risk of inconsistent regula-
tion by different states upon particular takeover activities.
The threat of inconsistent regulation was applied to the Indiana statute
in the Court's discussion in CTS Corp.'62 The Court in CTS Corp. ad-
dressed this commerce clause issue when it stated: "[The takeover statute
poses no problem so long as] each State regulates voting rights only in the
corporations it has created .... 163 Therefore, the extraterritorial effect on
159. But see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-5 (state takeover statute only applies to corporations
incorporated in Indiana).
160. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
161. It has been held that "[s]tatutes requiring business operations to be performed in the
home state that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere impose a burden on commerce that
is per se illegal." Kidwill, 577 F.2d at 1282 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 145).
162. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88.
163. Id. at 89.
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interstate commerce caused by the Wisconsin statute undoubtedly violates
the second portion of the test laid down by the court in CTS Corp."'
In conclusion, states will continue to argue that they have a substantial
interest in protecting employees, customers, suppliers, local communities
and other constituencies. However, Wisconsin's statute ffies in the face of
core commerce values and is likely to be found unconstitutional if
challenged.
V. THE FUTURE OF TAKEOVER REGULATION UNCLEAR
In the future, Congress may once again take an important role in the
state takeover debate. The CTS Corp. decision occurred in the midst of
Congress' review of existing federal tender offer laws. 165 The question still
remains whether Congress will either broaden federal regulation of tender
offers which, in turn, may once again pre-empt certain state actions or reaf-
firm the traditional role of states in regulating corporate affairs. 166 The bal-
ancing of federal and state regulation is likely to be a difficult task for
federal lawmakers and will draw considerable debate.' 67 However, it is un-
likely that Congress will allow state law to be swept away to facilitate na-
tionwide tender offers. 168
Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") is pres-
ently more favorably disposed to regulate takeovers.169 The new chairman
of the SEC has asked Congress to provide the SEC with the power to pre-
164. Id.
165. For a discussion of a proposed bill, see Proxmire, The M & A "Game" Is Not A Produc-
tive Enterprise, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1987.
166. For an interesting examination of proposals introduced by Congress between 1963-1987,
see Romano, supra note 21, at 470. Romano suggests that the most probable result of Congres-
sional legislation would be a greater restriction on takeover bids. Id. at 503.
167. One commentator has suggested that the Bush Administration may be more likely to
regulate hostile takeovers than did the Reagan Administration. See Romano, supra note 21, at
489; see also Senate Panel Approves Takeover Bill, is Neutral on State Anti-takeover Laws, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1479 (Oct. 2, 1987); Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
168. One senate bill is attempting to tighten the borders of the Williams Act. Senate Bill S.
1323 proposes the following: 1) shorten from ten days to five days the period within which a
Schedule 14D must be filed, and ban additional purchases of shares until this disclosure is made;
2) stiffen requirement on disclosure of the bidder's intent; 3) discourage greenmail by allowing the
recapture, by the target corporation, of greenmail profits; and 4) lengthen the minimum tender
offer period from twenty business days to thirty-five business days. Boyer, supra note 18, at 587-
88; see also S. 1323, Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Proxmire, supra note 24, at 353. For a discussion of the bill, see Proxmire, supra note 165.
169. See Gigot, Reaganite Regret: SEC Chief Is Just A Regular Guy, Wall St. J., July 8, 1988,
at 12, col. 3.
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empt state anti-takeover laws. 7° This makes sense considering the SEC's
ability to respond quickly as legislators draft successive generations of take-
over statutes aimed to provide state advantages. This may be the only way
for consistent regulation to steer through what SEC chairman calls "a maze
of overlapping and conflicting regulation."''
Even if Congress or the SEC take the lead in takeover regulation, it is
likely that the political forum will simply shift from the state legislatures to
Congress or the doors of the SEC. 172 Given the zeal with which states have
pursued the protection of their corporate citizens, it is doubtful whether
Congress or any regulatory agency will be able to withstand the political
pressure which can be and has been created surrounding this issue. The
stakes are sufficiently high to force legislative ingenuity. Ultimately, the bat-
tles surrounding takeover legislation may be destined to rage on in our
courts.
V. CONCLUSION
State regulation of the takeover process was inevitable. The political
and economic pressure exerted by internal interests in Wisconsin has re-
sulted in the formation of regulations that will not withstand a constitu-
tional challenge. Wisconsin's new takeover statute is a clear example of
how good intentions can result in legislation that is constitutionally
questionable.
Pre-emption and commerce clause concerns will continue to create
problems for drafters of state takeover legislation. Recent case law indi-
cates that the statutes enhancing shareholder interests are far more likely to
withstand constitutional challenge than those statutes enhancing the inter-
ests of management. However, pro-management legislation unnecessarily
interferes with the natural movements of the market and the shareholder's
right to contract with a bidder. Managers have far too much incentive to
short-circuit takeover attempts. The result can be the inability of investors
to receive the full economic potential of their investment and the blockage
of an important market force which contributes to corporate efficiency.
The future of takeover legislation is likely to shift from the state forum
to the federal arena. However, considering local interests affected in any
170. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, § 1 at 41, col. 3; see also Pending Legislation Regarding
Contests for Corporate Control: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Telecommunications & Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1987) (statement of David
S. Ruder).
171. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, § 1 at 41, col. 3.
172. See The Battle Over Tender Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Congress,
20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 60 (Jan. 15, 1988).
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given takeover situation, it is likely that the courts will ultimately be re-
quired to resolve the constitutional and practical issues raised by the exist-
ence of corporate takeovers in a capitalistic society.
RONALD G. PEZZE, JR.
